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Abstract 
This paper focuses on how the subprime crisis affects the director compensation of 
financial and non-financial firms as well as whether director compensation is correlated 
with firm performance, stock performance, leverage ratio and other factors. I find that for 
financial firms, the director total compensation is positively related to ROE before and 
after the crisis while negatively related during the crisis. The total compensation has a 
positive relation with P/E before and during the crisis while a negative relation after the 
crisis. The director total compensation is also positive related to leverage ratio in the 
subprime crisis while negative related before and after the crisis. As for non-financial 
firms, the director total compensation has the same correlation with ROE as financial 
firms. But the relationship between the total compensation of non-financial firms and P/E 
is completely adverse to the relationship for financial firms while the relationship with 
the leverage ratio is still same for two groups of firms.  
 
 
Keywords:  Director Compensation; Firm performance; Leverage; Subprime Crisis 
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1. Introduction 
The subprime crisis is generally regarded as the most serious financial crisis since the 
Great Depression. It originated in the financial firms and had a negative influence on the 
whole U.S. economy. Recent studies try to examine the relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance throughout the crisis. However, limited research is 
available for how director compensation is affected by the subprime crisis. 
 
My motivation for focusing on the board of directors is as follows. Firstly, boards are one 
of the internal corporate governance mechanisms that monitor and advise management in 
fulfilling the mandate to protect stockholder interests. This role should be particularly 
important during the crisis. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) indicate that in a booming 
economy, boards tend to be reactive because good firm performance increases executives’ 
bargaining power and reduces board independence. However, in an economy recession, 
boards become more proactive and independent as the bad firm performance reduces 
executives’ negotiation power. Secondly, a key mandate of the board is to review and 
guide a firm’s risk-management policy. As one of the major reasons of the subprime 
crisis is the managerial excessive risk-taking behaviour, I wish to research the relation 
between board directors and firm performance as well as the leverage of firms’ capital 
structure before, during and after the subprime crisis period. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and to what extent the subprime crisis 
affects the compensation of corporate boards, which is an important internal corporate 
governance mechanism, both for financial firms as well as nonfinancial firms. I focus on 
both director total compensation and director cash compensation. I also try to examine 
whether and to what extent the director compensation is correlated with firm performance, 
stock performance, leverage ratio and other control variables before, during and after the 
subprime crisis. To reach these targets, I use t-test and multi-variable regression to check 
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the significance level of the results. I find that except for firm size, there are no 
significant results between any of the variables and total compensation. Thus, though I 
report in this study the correlation of the results, it is important to emphasize that one 
should be cautious in interpreting these results as suggesting a strong relation between 
these variables and director compensation. My analysis reveals that directors’ cash 
compensation is relatively stable and increases over time, while total compensation seems 
to move somewhat with the performance of the stock market. 
 
I find that after the end of the subprime crisis, the average director total compensation of 
financial firms went up sharply and in the aftermath of these crises, during the years 2010 
to 2011, compensation had a large dip again. Compared with financial firms, during the 
period of 2009 to 2011, the average director total compensation of non-financial firms 
was relatively stable. I also find that for financial firms, the director total compensation is 
positively correlated to ROE before and after the crisis while negatively related during 
the crisis. The total compensation has a positive relation with P/E before and during the 
crisis while negative relation after the crisis. The director total compensation is positive 
related to leverage ratio in the subprime crisis while negative related before and after the 
crisis. In terms of non-financial firms, the director total compensation has the same 
correlation with ROE as financial firms while the cash compensation is different. The 
relationship between the total compensation of non-financial firms and P/E is completely 
adverse to the relationship for financial firms. As far as for leverage ratio, the director 
total compensation of non-financial firms have the same relationship as financial firms. 
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2 Literature Review 
Although there are different payment practices among firms in different industries, the 
executive and director compensation packages are usually composed of five basic 
components: cash salary, annual bonus, payouts from inventive plans, restricted stock 
grants and restricted option grants. The relative importance of these components changes 
over time while they are correlated with diverse factors, including the firm performance.  
 
A number of papers have researched the relevant determinants of executive and director 
compensation packages. A large number of literatures examine the correlation between 
risk and compensation, but the results are mixed. Holmstrom (1979) presents a model 
which predicts a negative relation between risk and compensation incentives. Prendergast 
(2002) shows a positive relation between risk and incentives. In terms of the factor firm 
size, different researchers used different measurements. Baker and Hall (2004) take the 
perspective that if the strength of incentives is measured by the change in executive 
compensation for every $1000 in shareholders’ wealth, firm size is negatively correlated 
to incentives; if the strength of incentives is measured by the change in executive 
compensation for every $1000 in shareholders’ wealth, firm size is negatively correlated 
to incentives. Researchers also find that firms with more growth opportunities provide 
their executives with stronger incentives (Mehran, 1995). As for the factor leverage, John 
and John (1993) find that except aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interest, 
executive compensation plays the role of a commitment mechanism to mitigate risk-
shifting incentive and they predict that firms with higher leverage provide their 
executives with weaker incentives. Some researchers also think importance of executives 
and directors’ abilities when determining their compensation. Milbourn (2003) finds that 
executives with higher perceived abilities are given much stronger compensation. 
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The subprime crisis of 2007 to 2008 has been partly blamed on remuneration policies in 
financial institutions. Turner (2009) states that there is a strong prima facie evidence that 
inappropriate incentive structures play a role in encouraging behaviour which contributed 
to the financial crisis. After examining corporate governance policies in 306 financial 
institutions among 31 countries during the financial crisis, Erkens (2009) finds that 
financial firms which used executive compensation packages with more emphasis on 
non-equity incentives such as salary and bonuses rather than equity-based compensation, 
performed worse during the financial crisis and took more risk before the crisis. Using a 
cross-country comparison among the performance of banks during the financial crisis, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2010) find that it is the fragility of banks’ balance sheets, and 
especially their dependence on short-term capital market funding that led to their poor 
firm performance. 
 
A series of researchers also have investigated whether the performance of US banks in 
the financial crisis was correlated with executive compensation and incentives before the 
financial crisis. Conyon (2010) states that the importance of compensation in stimulating 
excessive risk taking before the crisis was decreased by the roles of loose monetary 
policy, social housing policies, and financial innovation. Adams (2009) shows that the 
governance of financial firms is not worse than non-financial firms in S&P 500, and that 
US banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent than the banks 
of other countries. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) take the perspective that perverse 
incentives are restrained if the interests of executives are aligned with shareholders 
through their ownership of firm stocks; they do not find evidence that banks with chief 
executive officers whose incentives were less well aligned with the interests of their 
shareholders performed worse in the financial crisis. 
 
Apart from research on executive aspect, there are a number of recent studies which 
focus on whether internal corporate governance has an impact on firm performance 
during the subprime crisis and most focus on financial companies. Early studies also have 
some findings relevant to the relation between internal corporate governance and firm 
performance. Breach and Friedman (2000) and Mitton (2002) indicate that corporate 
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governance is of the first importance in determining firm performance during a crisis and 
this is mainly caused by two factors: firstly, expropriation by managers is likely to 
become more severe during these periods and secondly, the quality of corporate 
governance is likely to attract more scrutiny during the crisis.  
 
Although limited empirical research exists on the relationship between corporate boards 
and firm performance, the results are still mixed. I then follow this stream to evaluate 
how the compensation of board directors is affected by the subprime crisis and whether 
director compensation is closely correlated with firm performance and other factors. As 
there is limited recent research on non-financial firms in this stream, I also compare the 
director compensation of financial firms with that of non-financial firms to have a 
relatively comprehensive picture. 
  13 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and Variables 
To research how director compensation is affected by the subprime crisis for both 
financial and non-financial firms, I use two databases to collect targeted data. Firstly, we 
use Director Compensation database under Compustat Quarterly Updates file to collect 
data for annual director compensation. I select the year from 2006 to 2012 and using the 
format of company codes gvkey (Company ID Number), we select the variables: (1) 
total_sec (Total Compensation), (2) cash_fees (Cash Compensation, (3) year (Fiscal 
Year), (4) sic (SIC code). Secondly, I use Fundamental Annual database under 
Compustat North American Annual Updates file to collect data for financial information 
of the financial and non-financial firms. I also select the year from 2006 to 2012. With 
the same format of company codes gvkey (Company ID Number), I select the variables: 
(1) fyear (Fiscal Year), (2) at (Total Assets), (3) epspi (Earnings Per Share – Including 
Extraordinary Items), (4) ni (Net Income), (5) seq (Stockholders Equity), (6) costat 
(Active/Inactive Status Marker), (7) prcc_f (Price Close-Annual-Fiscal). 
 
Through dropping the inactive status firms (“costat” equals “I”) and matching two 
databases using the common variables “gvkey” and “year”, I finally target my sample 
which is composed of 2134 firms and years: 188 financial firms and years with the first 
two digits of sic 60 and 1996 non-financial firms and years. This sample is also 
equivalent to 61 financial firms and 685 non-financial firms totally. To avoid the extreme 
left tail of compensation amount, I choose to use the highest director total compensation 
each year for each company to represent the level of director total compensation for 
corresponding company each year. 
 
According to the Figure I, I find that the average director total compensation is more 
volatile than the average director cash compensation throughout the whole period. This is 
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mainly because director total compensation consists of not only cash salary and bonus, 
but also restricted stock awards and option awards, which are quite dependent on the 
performance of changing stock price and more volatile than cash incentives. 
 
To be specific, in terms of the director total compensation, from 2006 to 2007, for both 
financial and non-financial firms, the average director total compensation went down 
while the average director total compensation of financial firms kept higher than that of 
non-financial firms. Over the period of 2008 to 2009, which is subprime crisis period, the 
average director total compensation of financial firms decreased sharply, starting at a 
level of 160 and ending at a level of less than 90. In the meantime, the average director 
total compensation of non-financial firms fluctuated smoothly, increasing a little from a 
level of 140 to 190 between 2007 and 2008 and then decreasing a small amount from a 
level of 190 to 170 between 2008 and 2009. This indicates that the non-financial 
industries were not largely affected by the subprime crisis while the financial industry 
was exposed to great risk and uncertainty.  
 
After 2009, the end of the subprime crisis, the average director total compensation of 
financial firms went up significantly during the period of 2009 to 2010, starting at a level 
of 90 and ending at a level of almost 230. From 2010 to 2011, the average director total 
compensation of financial firms had a dip again from a level of 230 to nearly 145. This 
probably implies that after the crisis, the financial industry went on recovery but still got 
exposure to diversified risks and uncertain challenges of future development and business 
modes. In contrast to financial firms, during the period of 2009 to 2011, the average 
director total compensation of non-financial firms was relatively stable, staying at a level 
of almost 170. Since 2011, for both financial and non-financial firms, the average director 
total compensation increased greatly and kept nearly parallel. The average director total 
compensation of financial firms kept lower than that of non-financial firms. 
 
As for the director cash compensation, I find that over the whole period of 2006 to 2012, 
the average director cash compensation of financial firms had a slow uptrend, which is 
quite similar to that of non-financial firms, starting at a level of 80 and ending at a level 
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of almost 110. This proves again that the cash components of director compensation are 
relatively stable before, during and after the subprime crisis. Before 2011, the average 
director cash compensation of financial firms was a little lower than that of non-financial 
firms. However, after 2011, the average director cash compensation of financial firms 
increased more quickly than that of non-financial firms and became larger than the 
average director cash compensation in non-financial firms, reaching a level of more than 
120. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 T-test 
To ensure that the director compensation is correlated with firm performance, I use t-test 
to evaluate both whether the difference of average director total compensation is 
significant between financial and non-financial firms and whether the difference of 
average director cash compensation is significant between financial and non-financial 
firms. 
0 
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Figure I: Director Compensation for financial and non-financial firms  
($thousands) 
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Table I shows that the difference of average director total compensation is not significant 
between financial and non-financial firms during the following periods 2006 to 2012, 
2006 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012, because all the Pr(|T| > |t|) in the above three periods are 
largely greater than 0.05. However, only during the period of 2008 to 2009 which is the 
subprime crisis period, the Pr(|T| > |t|) is very close to 0.05 and this proves that the 
difference of average director total compensation is significant between financial and 
non-financial firms at the 5% significance level. 
 
  Table I: Director total compensation t-test     
    Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. N t-value df 
2006-2012 
Non-financial 181.94  254.72  5.77  1946  
0.44  2132  
Financial 173.16  332.21  24.23  188  
Difference 8.78  
 
20.04  
   
2006-2007 
Non-financial 157.12  309.90  16.42  356  
-1.13  380  
Financial 227.63  281.03  55.12  26  
Difference -70.51  
 
62.59  
   
2008-2009 
Non-financial 177.54  258.72  10.93  560  
1.91  602  
Financial 102.66  105.37  15.89  44  
Difference 74.88  
 
39.28  
   
2010-2012 
Non-financial 192.91  229.78  7.16  1030  
0.22  1146  
Financial 187.45  390.77  35.97  118  
Difference 5.46    24.39        
 
Table II shows that the difference of the average director cash compensation is not 
significant between financial and non-financial firms at the 5% significance level, both 
during the whole period and during all the sub-periods (2006 to 2012, 2006 to 2007, 2008 
to 2009 and 2010 to 2012). This is because all the Pr(|T| > |t|) in the above four periods 
are largely greater than 0.05.  
 
  Table II: Director cash compensation t-test     
    Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. N t-value df 
2006-2012 
Non-financial 99.90  111.30  2.52  1946  
0.14  2132  
Financial 98.66  152.47  11.12  188  
Difference 1.24  
 
8.82  
   
2006-2007 
Non-financial 82.06  107.53  5.70  356  
0.30  380  
Financial 75.64  59.71  11.71  26  
Difference 6.41  
 
21.34  
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2008-2009 
Non-financial 93.71  134.33  5.68  560  
0.75  602  
Financial 78.33  62.13  9.37  44  
Difference 15.39  
 
20.43  
   
2010-2012 
Non-financial 109.43  96.96  3.02  1030  
-0.18  1146  
Financial 111.32  185.84  17.11  118  
Difference -1.89    10.63        
 
In summary, comparing financial firms with non-financial firms during the period of 
2006 to 2012, the difference of average director total compensation is significant between 
financial and non-financial firms at the 5% significance level only in the subprime crisis 
period (2008 to 2009) and not significant in other sub-periods. Moreover, the difference 
of average director cash compensation is not significant between financial and non-
financial firms in all the sub-periods from 2006 to 2012. This conclusion also coincides 
with the findings of Figure I. 
3.2.2 Regression Model 
Based on the previous findings, I expect to further research how the director 
compensation related to the firm performance, growth opportunity, leverage ratio and 
other factors for both financial firms and non-financial firms respectively. I hypothesize 
that if the subprime crisis has an obvious influence on the firms’ performance, the board 
director compensation would be affected correspondingly. The linear regression models 
are as follows: 
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Table III illustrates the independent variables and dependent variables used in the models. 
The independent variables are firm performance variable (ROE), growth opportunity 
variable (P/E) and normalized leverage ratio. The control variable is firm size. The 
dependent variables are director total compensation and director cash compensation 
respectively. To remove trends in volatility, I choose to use the natural logarithm of 
director total compensation, director cash compensation and firm size variables rather 
than directly use the real numbers. 
 
Table III: Variable definitions and descriptions 
Variable name Variable description 
Total compensation 
total_sec: The sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock granted, 
restricted options granted, non-equity incentive plans and other 
compensation. 
Cash compensation cash_fees: cash compensation including salary and bonus 
ROE ni/seq: Net income divided by stockholders equity 
P/E 
prcc_f/epspi: Price Close-Annual-Fiscal divided by Earnings Per 
Share – Including Extraordinary Items 
firm size at: total assets 
norm_leverage  
leverage ratio: at/seq: total assets divided by stockholders equity. 
Make leverage ratio divided by industry leverage ratio median to 
get normalized leverage ratio. 
industry_effects 
An industry dummy variable used to control for unobserved 
industry heterogeneities that are correlated with compensation 
year_effects 
A year dummy variable used to control for unobserved year 
heterogeneities that are correlated with compensation 
4 Results 
Table IV indicates the relationship between director total compensation and firm 
performance for financial firms and non-financial firms respectively during the whole 
period (2006 to 2012). Interestingly, the director total compensation is negatively 
correlated with firm performance variable ROE for both groups of firms. Besides, the 
total compensation has a negative relation with both P/E and leverage ratio for financial 
firms while a positive relation for non-financial firms. In terms of firm size, both groups 
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of firms has a positive relation between their director total compensation and firm size 
(total assets). 
 
Table IV: Total compensation and firm performance from 2006 to 2012 
  
Financial firms 
 
Non-Financial firms 
 
Time period   2006-2012   2006-2012   
Variables 
     
ROE 
 
-0.0117 
 
-0.0034 
 
 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-0.69) 
 PE 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(0.30) 
 norm_leverage 
 
-0.0069 
 
0.0006 
 
 
 
(-0.31) 
 
(1.11) 
 ln(firm size) 
 
0.2538*** 
 
0.1868*** 
 
 
 
(4.95) 
 
(19.48) 
 Intercept 
 
2.4196*** 
 
1.9142*** 
 
 
 
(4.79) 
 
(3.08) 
 year_effects 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 industry_effects 
  
+ 
 Number of obs (N) 141 
 
1,584 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.211   0.368   
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To be specific, the following tables indicate the relationships before, during and after the 
subprime crisis comparatively. Table V and Table VI shows that for financial firms, both 
director total compensation and director cash compensation are correlated with firm 
performance, P/E, leverage ratio and firm size, as the coefficients are different from zero. 
However, the correlation is different. To be specific, the director total compensation is 
positively related to ROE before and after the crisis while negatively related during the 
crisis. The cash compensation is always negatively correlated with ROE throughout the 
whole period. In addition, the total compensation has a positive relation with P/E before 
and during the crisis while negative relation after the crisis. The cash compensation 
relationship has a positive relation with P/E before and after the crisis while negative 
relation during the crisis. In terms of leverage ratio, the director total compensation is 
positive related to it in the sub-period of 2008 to 2009 (subprime crisis) while negative 
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related in the other two sub-periods 2006 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012. The cash 
compensation is only negative related to leverage ratio after the subprime crisis. 
 
Table V: Financial firms: total compensation and firm performance  
Time period 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
Variables 
      
ROE 0.9384* -0.2830 0.0036 0.9410 -0.2535 -0.0765 
 
(1.73) (-0.33) (0.02) (1.67) (-0.29) (-0.43) 
P/E 0.0072 0.0002 -0.0052 0.0073 0.0000 -0.0027 
 
(0.41) (0.09) (-0.80) (0.40) (0.01) (-0.40) 
norm_leverage -1.4217* 0.0468 -0.0050 -1.4266 0.0496 -0.0224 
 
(-1.77) (0.10) (-0.11) (-1.70) (0.11) (-0.48) 
ln(firm size) 0.4067** 0.3624*** 0.2199*** 0.4066** 0.3624*** 0.2301*** 
 
(2.67) (3.84) (3.14) (2.61) (3.78) (3.33) 
Intercept 2.0816 1.0202 2.9675*** 2.0862 1.0179 2.8431*** 
 
(1.44) (0.99) (4.29) (1.40) (0.97) (4.17) 
year_effects 
   
+ + + 
Number of obs (N) 25 34 82 25 34 82 
Adjusted R-squared 0.276 0.340 0.124 0.277 0.342 0.175 
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table VI: Financial firms: cash compensation and firm performance  
Time period 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
  2010-
2012 
Variables 
      
ROE -0.3415 -0.9998 -0.0776 -0.4228 -0.6081 -0.0710 
 
(-0.44) (-0.71) (-0.56) (-0.53) (-0.40) (-0.48) 
P/E 0.0087 -0.0007 0.0032 0.0075 -0.0016 0.0030 
 
(0.35) (-0.15) (0.63) (0.30) (-0.33) (0.56) 
norm_leverage 0.5502 0.0003 -0.0195 0.6961 0.1321 -0.0185 
 
(0.48) (0.00) (-0.53) (0.58) (0.16) (-0.49) 
ln(firm size) -0.0493 0.0156 0.2225*** -0.0466 0.0021 0.2216*** 
 
(-0.21) (0.08) (4.17) (-0.20) (0.01) (4.04) 
Intercept 3.7051* 3.6951 2.2478*** 3.5456 3.7009 2.2584*** 
 
(1.76) (1.53) (4.40) (1.65) (1.52) (4.29) 
year_effects 
   + + + 
Number of obs (N) 23 43 112 23 43 112 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.027 0.142 0.047 0.042 0.142 
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table VII and Table IX indicates that for non-financial firms, the director total 
compensation has the same correlation with ROE as financial firms while the cash 
compensation is positively related with ROE before and during the crisis and negative 
related after the crisis. Moreover, the relationship between the total compensation of non-
financial firms and P/E is completely adverse to the relationship for financial firms. And 
the relationship between the director cash compensation of non-financial firms and P/E is 
also different from the relationship for financial firms. As for the leverage ratio, same as 
financial firms, the total compensation is positively correlated to leverage ratio during the 
crisis while negatively correlated before and after the crisis. However, the relationship 
between the cash compensation of non-financial firms and leverage ratio is completely 
adverse to the relationship for financial firms: for non-financial firms, the relationship is 
negative before and during the crisis while positive after the crisis.  
 
Furthermore, after considering the year effects, for both financial firms and non-financial 
firms, the results of relationships between compensation and other variables including 
ROE, P/E and leverage ratio keep same. After considering the year effects and industry 
effects, in terms of non-financial firms, there are only three changes. The total 
compensation becomes positively correlated to P/E after 2009 (subprime crisis). The cash 
compensation turns out to be negatively related to P/E and leverage ratio after the 
subprime crisis.  
 
Moreover, indicated from the tables, for both financial firms and non-financial firms, 
director total compensation and director cash compensation are always positively related 
to firm size, no matter whether year effects and industry effects are considered. 
 
Table VII: Non-financial firms: total compensation and firm performance  
Time period 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
Variables 
      
ROE 0.0019 -0.0170 0.0045 0.0017 -0.0159 0.0045 
 
(0.20) (-0.73) (0.47) (0.18) (-0.68) (0.47) 
P/E -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003 
 
(-0.66) (-0.52) (0.99) (-0.59) (-0.52) (1.00) 
norm_leverage -0.0003 0.0009 0.0015* -0.0004 0.0008 0.0014 
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(-0.14) (0.54) (1.65) (-0.16) (0.50) (1.59) 
ln(firm size) 0.2220*** 0.1531*** 0.1847*** 0.2226*** 0.1530*** 0.1838*** 
 
(9.07) (8.43) (19.31) (9.09) (8.41) (19.16) 
Intercept 3.0396*** 3.8675*** 3.7426*** 3.0348*** 3.8685*** 3.7498*** 
 
(15.98) (26.92) (48.83) (15.94) (26.91) (48.81) 
year_effects 
  
+ + + 
industry_effects 
     
Number of obs (N) 297 434 853 297 434 853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.234 0.145 0.306 0.235 0.146 0.307 
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table VIII: Non-financial firms: total compensation and firm performance 
(year effects and industry effects) 
Time period 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012 
Variables 
   
ROE 0.0143 -0.0276 -0.0075 
 
(1.43) (-1.13) (-0.72) 
P/E -0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 
 
(-0.68) (0.10) (1.25) 
norm_leverage -0.0011 0.0017 0.0004 
 
(-0.47) (1.01) (0.50) 
ln(firm size) 0.2033*** 0.1478*** 0.1998*** 
 
(7.12) (6.81) (18.53) 
Intercept 3.0874*** 4.4404*** 1.9343*** 
 
(6.22) (9.89) (3.82) 
year_effects + + + 
industry_effects + + + 
Number of obs (N) 297 434 853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.422 0.303 0.438 
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table IX: Non-financial firms: cash compensation and firm performance  
Time period 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2012 
Variables 
      
ROE 0.0037 0.0249 -0.0023 0.0037 0.0250 -0.0023 
 
(0.37) (1.17) (-0.22) (0.37) (1.17) (-0.22) 
P/E -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0000 
 
(-1.44) (-0.47) (0.06) (-1.42) (-0.46) (0.13) 
norm_leverage -0.0003 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0020 0.0001 
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(-0.15) (-1.39) (0.20) (-0.15) (-1.37) (0.08) 
ln(firm size) 0.1633*** 0.1801*** 0.1763*** 0.1635*** 0.1799*** 0.1735*** 
 
(6.30) (9.07) (17.74) (6.29) (9.06) (17.46) 
Intercept 2.8997*** 2.9440*** 3.1674*** 2.8977*** 2.9458*** 3.1889*** 
 
(14.82) (19.56) (40.01) (14.75) (19.56) (40.29) 
year_effects 
   + + + 
industry_effects 
      Number of obs (N) 328 490 940 328 490 940 
Adjusted R-squared 0.120 0.148 0.253 0.120 0.149 0.262 
t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table X: Non-financial firms: cash compensation and firm performance 
(year effects and industry effects) 
Time period 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012 
Variables 
   
ROE 0.0091 0.0078 -0.0112 
 
(0.83) (0.32) (-0.96) 
P/E -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(-1.41) (-0.24) (-0.31) 
norm_leverage -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0009 
 
(-0.03) (-0.64) (-0.95) 
ln(firm size) 0.1466*** 0.1579*** 0.1793*** 
 
(4.76) (6.51) (15.48) 
Intercept 3.2718*** 3.8904*** 2.1013*** 
 
(6.04) (7.64) (3.75) 
year_effects + + + 
industry_effects + + + 
Number of obs (N) 328 490 940 
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.253 0.376 
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Conclusion 
I focus on the studies of how the board director compensations of financial firms and 
non-financial firms are affected by subprime crisis and whether board director 
compensation is closely related to firm performance, leverage ratio and other factors. I 
also distinguish director total compensation from director cash compensation in the 
research and identify the changes of these relations before, during and after the subprime 
crisis.  
 
Firstly, I compare the compensation changing trends between financial firms and non-
financial firms, using the average director total compensation and the average director 
cash compensation respectively. Secondly, I do several simple t-test to prove the trends 
and relative changing trends. I find that during the period of 2008 to 2009, the average 
director total compensation of financial firms decreased sharply while that of non-
financial firms fluctuated smoothly. After the end of the subprime crisis, the average 
director total compensation of financial firms went up sharply and from 2010 to 2011, 
had a large dip again. Compared with financial firms, during the period of 2009 to 2011, 
the average director total compensation of non-financial firms was relatively stable. After 
2011, for both financial and non-financial firms, the average director total compensation 
increased greatly and kept nearly parallel.  
 
Thirdly, I use multi-regression method to evaluate the relations between board director 
compensation and firm performance, P/E and leverage ratio as well as other factors. I find 
that for financial firms, the director total compensation is positively correlated to ROE 
before and after the crisis while negatively related during the crisis. The director cash 
compensation is always negatively correlated with ROE throughout the whole period. 
Moreover, the total compensation has a positive relation with P/E before and during the 
crisis while negative relation after the crisis. The director total compensation is positive 
  25 
related to leverage ratio in the subprime crisis while negative related before and after the 
crisis. The cash compensation is only negative related to leverage ratio after the subprime 
crisis. As for non-financial firms, the director total compensation has the same correlation 
with ROE as financial firms while the cash compensation is positively related with ROE 
before and during the crisis and negative related after the crisis. In addition, the 
relationship between the total compensation of non-financial firms and P/E is completely 
adverse to the relationship for financial firms. In terms of the leverage ratio, same as 
financial firms, the total compensation is positively correlated to leverage ratio during the 
crisis while negatively correlated before and after the crisis. However, the relationship 
between the cash compensation of non-financial firms and leverage ratio is completely 
adverse to the relationship for financial firms: for non-financial firms, the relationship is 
negative before and during the crisis while positive after the crisis.  
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